COURT OF APPEALS RULES THAT MONEY DAMAGES
ARE AVAILABLE UNDER IDEA FOR DENIAL
OF FAPE
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued a decision
which supported allowing monetary damages in special education
cases brought under Section 504, Section 1983, and the IDEA. In
doing so, the Third Circuit remanded the case to the District
Court level for a determination on the issue of damages as it
relates to the FAPE claim. W.V. v Matula, 23 IDELR
411 (3rd Cir., 1995).
Plaintiff, W.V., and her minor child, E.J., moved to
Hackettstown, NJ, during the summer of 1991. Before the start of
school in the fall of 1991, W.V. meet with Defendant Matula, the
principal of the elementary school, to discuss her concerns about
E.J.'s behavioral problems. The parent filed out forms for the
school district indicating that E.J. had previously received
speech and language therapy, and that his behavioral problems
included touching and hitting other children. E.J. began school
as a first grader in September 1991. Soon thereafter, the teacher
reported that E.J. exhibited a number of disruptive behaviors
such as fighting with other students, refusal to remain seated,
repeatedly touching other children, making noises, failing to pay
attention, and had difficultly beginning and finishing tasks.
Additionally, E.J. exhibited enuretic and encopretic behaviors.
The teacher informed W.V. that E.J. may have ADHD.
In October, the parent met with the teacher and the chief
school administrator to discuss E.J.'s behavioral and academic
problems. The district, however, did not refer E.J. for an
evaluation or special education services, nor did anyone inform
the parent of the student's possible entitlement to such
services.
At about the same time, the student began seeing a private
therapist. This private therapist later diagnosed the student has
having ADHD. The parent then requested that the school refer the
student for evaluation, however, the school refused. Finally,
after a meeting between the parent, private therapist and school
employees, as well as the parent providing information showing
that ADHD may be a handicap under IDEA or Section 504, the school
agreed to refer the student for an evaluation.
In April of 1992, the evaluation performed by the school
determined that the student had ADHD and was eligible for
services pursuant to Section 504. The district did not believe,
however, that the student was eligible for services under IDEA
since he was achieving at or above grade level. Although the
district had determined that this student was eligible for
services under Section 504, the district did not begin providing
those services. In June, 1992, the parent requested a due process
hearing, seeking an independent evaluation and classification of
the student as neurologically impaired, thereby rendering him
eligible under the IDEA. At the time set for the due process
hearing, the district entered into a settlement agreement with
the parent relating to the issue of the IEE. The balance of the
hearing was adjourned.
The independent evaluation found that the student suffered
from Tourette's Syndrome, a severe form of obsessive compulsive
disorder and ADHD. Despite these findings, the school district
would not agree to an eligibility label of "neurologically
impaired," but concluded that the student was
"perceptually impaired."
The due process hearing was reconvened in April of 1993, and
after ten days of hearing, the parties entered into a settlement
finding the student neurologically impaired, incorporating an IEP
and providing $14,000 in attorney fees to the parent.
Additional administrative proceedings followed, all being
consolidated and referred to the hearing officer. After 27 days
of hearing, the hearing officer issued a 54 page opinion
directing the board to: 1) place the student in a private school
at the board's expense; 2) pay prospectively for the student's
sessions with a private therapist; 3) reimburse the parent for
the cost of an independent evaluation which the board had refused
to provide; and 4) provide a supplemental occupational therapy
evaluation. The hearing officer found that the parent was
"essentially correct about the major points in dispute . . .
including evaluation, classification, and placement."
Following the conclusion of the first hearing in the summer
1993, the parent commenced an action in Federal District Court
alleging claims under Section 504, Section 1983, the Equal
Protection Clause, the IDEA, Section 1985, and various state
causes of action. The parent sought compensatory and punitive
damages for the school district's failure to provide E.J. with a
free and appropriate public education.
As a number of appeals had been taken from the various
administrative proceedings which were consolidated at the
District Court level with the damage claims. After discussions
between the parties, a number of defendants were dismissed by
stipulation. The action proceeded against Matula, the principal,
the first grade teacher of E.J., his second grade teacher, the
director of special education, the school administrator, the
school nurse, the school psychologist, the speech and language
therapist, and an LD teacher. All of these individuals were sued
in their official capacity as well as individually.
The remaining defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting
that the settlement agreement barred this action and, secondly,
that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies. The District Court denied the motion finding that the
settlement agreement did not unambiguously bar the federal
action, and that further administrative proceedings were futile
since the parent had already received all remedies that a hearing
officer could give. The defendants requested that the court
reconsider, and upon reconsideration the District Court reserved
itself and dismissed the action. The parents appealed to the
Third Circuit.
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and remanded
the matter for a trial on the IDEA damage claim. In doing so, the
court rejected the school district's argument that a damage claim
under Section 1983 based upon a violation of IDEA was
impermissible, and that the IDEA was the sole avenue for remedy.
The court acknowledged that historically, where Congress had
intended to foreclose such private enforcement, a Section 1983
action was impermissible. However, the court then discussed at
length the 1986 amendments to the IDEA which stated:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or
limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the
Constitution, Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 USCA
§ 790, et seq.] or other federal statutes protecting
the rights of handicapped children . . .." 20 USC §
1415(f). In doing so, the court found that the 1986 amendments
effectively overruled the Supreme Court case of Smith v Robinson,
468 US 992 (1984), and allowed for independent damage actions
under Section 504 and Section 1983. The Court also indicated that
damages were available for a denial of FAPE under Section 1983
and Section 504. As an action under Section 1983 does not confer
substantive rights, the action must be based on the underlying
violations of the IDEA and Section 504.
The Court remanded the matter back to the District Court for a
trial against the individual defendants on the damage claims for
denial of FAPE.
IMPLICATIONS:
Matula joins other cases in a growing body of law which
are allowing damage actions for alleged violations of IDEA and
denial of FAPE. Implicitedly, the court permits the action to be
brought individually against employees of a school district,
rather than against the school district in general. The named
defendants in this case were all teachers, administrators, and
evaluative personnel, as well as the school district and its
school board. Implicitedly, it can be argued that damages could
be awarded against these persons individually, as well as in
their official capacities. In light of the holding in another
recent case, Larson v Miller, 22 IDELR 957 (8th
Cir. 1995) [OP News, Vol. 8, No. 11, 1994-95], where
punitive damages were allowed against a superintendent and a
special education director personally, the threat of individual
personal liability becomes more clear.
Both of these cases are from other circuits. No case from the
Sixth Circuit has yet adopted the holding which were permit
damage claims under Section 1983 for violations of IDEA. Instead,
the Sixth Circuit continues to imply that such actions are not
allowable. See, Crocker v Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Assn, ____ IDELR ____ (6th Cir. 1992).
However, as punitive damages under Section 504 have, in general,
been allowed in the Sixth Circuit, a move towards permitting
damage claims may not be far behind.
The most effective way to guard against damage claims is through proper documentation and training. All district employees must be made aware of IEP requirements and provided inservice training to ensure proper implementation. General education personnel, as well as special educators, must be aware of a student's IEP. Failure to implement IEPs may ultimately lead to increased litigation and damage claims for alleged denial of FAPE. See also, Doe v Withers, 20 IDELR 422 (W Va, 1993), OP News, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1993.